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CASE COMMENT
Mental or Emotional Distress: Pigeonhole Recovery
or Independent Tort?
Petitioner was awarded compensation for mental suffering
and punitive damages' for the willful and malicious killing of
her pet dog.? The District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that
the trial judge should not have instructed the jury to consider
petitioner's mental suffering as an element of compensatory dam-
ages.' That court assumed that the compensation for mental suf-
fering actually represented an improper recovery of the dog's
sentimental value.4 The Florida Supreme Court granted certio-
rari, reversed, and held that although there may be some affinity
between sentimental value and mental suffering, the emotional
disturbance caused by the destruction of one's dog is compensable.
La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc., 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla.
1964).
The La Porte case may seem to permit recovery of a dog's
sentimental value, contrary to the general rule, particularly since
it does not discuss the relationship between sentimental value
and mental suffering.5 However, La Porte is distinguishable from
the cases establishing the rule. Persons are injured in two ways
by the destruction of their chattels - their emotional tranquility
is disturbed and the amount of their personal property is reduced.
Damages for the property loss could be measured by market
value, special value ascertainable by reference to the usefulness
or services of the dog, or sentimental value The latter term is
1. The plaintiff was awarded $2,000 compensatory damages and $1,000
punitive damages. The dog was purchased for $75 two years prior to its death.
See Associated Independents, Inc. v. La Porte, 158 So. 2d 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963).
2. Petitioner observed defendant's employee throw a garbage can in the
direction of her dog. When she rushed outside to protest, the garbage col-
lector laughed and departed. Ibid.
3. Ibid. The District Court of Appeal held that only the market value of
the dog and punitive damages could be recovered.
4. Generally a dog's sentimental value to its owner is not recoverable
upon its destruction. Kling v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 146 S.2d 635 (La.
App. 1962); Klein v. St. Louis Transit Co., 117 Mo. App. 691, 93 S.W. 281
(1906); Wilcox v. Butt's Drug Stores, 8 N.M. 502, 35 P.2d 978 (1934); Smith
v. Palace Transp. Co., 142 Mise. 93, 253 N.Y.S. 87 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1931);
4 Am. Jun. 2o Animals § 147 (1962); 3 C.J.S. Animals § 234 (1936).
5. 163 So. 2d at 269.
6. Generally, damages for the injury or destruction of a dog are measured
by the dog's market value. Wilcox v. Butt's Drug Stores, 38 N.M. 502, 85
P.2d 978 (1934); Blauvelt v. Cleveland, 198 App. Div. 229, 190 N.Y.S. 881
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used to describe the value that a person attaches to his dog
because of past experiences producing a tender feeling or sus-
ceptibility - presumably greater than the dog's market value.7
This measure has been rejected by the courts because it is entirely
subjective, is easily inflated, and is approximated by the other
measures. The cases establishing the rule only involved the choice
of measures for property damages - compensation of the owner
for his mental suffering or disturbance of mental tranquility was
not in issue." Plaintiff's hysteria required medical treatment;'
the La Porte court cited mental suffering cases10 and used lan-
guage indicating that the award was for mental suffering" and
not sentimental value.
Until recently, a mental or emotional disturbance, no matter
how serious, was not regarded as sufficient injury to make culpable
conduct actionable if it was the only legal consequence of such
conduct.'2 Early American cases permitted recovery of damages
(1921). Value measured by its usefulness to the owner may be recovered
only if the dog has no market value. Kling v. United States Fire Ins. Co.,
146 So. 2d 635 (La. App. 1962); Klein v. St. Louis Transit Co., 117 Mo. App.
691, 93 S.W. 281 (1906); Young's Bus Lines v. Redmon, 43 S.W.2d 266
(Tex. Civ. App. 1931). But see Wertman v. Tipping, 166 So. Rd 666 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
Punitive damages may be awarded where the killing of the dog was willful
and under aggravated circumstances. Dreyer v. Cyriacks, 112 Cal. App. 279,
297 Pac. 35 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931) ($25,000 punitive damages set aside as
excessive); Mendenhall v. Struck, 207 Iowa 1094, 224 N.W. 95 (1929); Ten-
hopen v. Walker, 96 Mich. 236, 55 N.W. 657 (1893).
7. 9 Vax,. L. Rnv. 681, 684 (1964).
8. "Mental suffering" has been used by the courts to describe a variety of
psychic disturbances. These may be classified into two main groups: (1)
transient disturbances of mental tranquility without disability, and (2)
severe disturbances of mental tranquility producing disability through physio-
logical mechanisms. See Smith & Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30
VA. L. REv. 87, 92-95 (1943); RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 46, comment f (Supp.
1948). Mental suffering should be distinguished from physical injuries caused
by psychic stimuli. See Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease:
Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 80 VA. L. REV. 193, 212-26 (1944).
9. 163 So. 2d at 268.
10. Slocum v. Food Fair Stores, 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958); Crane v.
Loftin, 70 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1954); Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla.
1950).
11. In comparing the instant case with another, involving mental suffer-
ing, the court stated: "[T]he anguish resulting from the mishandling of the
body of a child cannot be equated to the grief from the loss of a dog but that
does not imply that mental suffering from the loss of a pet dog ... is nothing
at all." 163 So. Ed at 269. (Emphasis added.)
12. Assault is an exception to this rule. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 47, com-
ment a (1934). The Restatement's position has been altered, however. See
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for mental suffering when they were the direct or natural result
of either an intentional tort committed under circumstances of
malice,a or a negligent act which caused physical injury by
impact' Subsequently, courts allowed recovery of damages for
mental suffering where physical injury was caused by psychic
stimuli."' Some courts now permit recovery for mental suffering
without physical injury, if the suffering is severe and brought
RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 24, comment c (Supp. 1948); note 16 infra and
accompanying text.
Mental suffering inflicted on a patron by an employee of a public utility
is another exception. Recovery is usually permitted on the ground that
mental suffering was a foreseeable consequence of a breach of contract and
that a utility occupies a special relationship to its patrons. E.g., Lipman v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 108 S.C. 151, 93 S.E. 714 (1917); Graham v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91 (1903). Contra, e.g., Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Speight, 254 U.S. 17 (1920).
13. See Phillips v. Hoyle, 70 Mass. (4 Grey) 568 (1855) (seduction); Stowe
v. Heywood, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 118 (1863) (enticement of child away from
home and performance of his services); Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281
(1868) (willful trespass to land); Lombard v. Lennox, 155 Mass. 70 (1891)
(willful slander); 2 GREENLEAv, EVDENCE § 267 (16th ed. 1899); RESTATEMENT,
ToRTs § 47(b) (1934).
14. Seger v. Town of Bakkhamsted, 22 Conn. 289 (1853) (impact);
Masters v. Town of Warren, 27 Conn. 293 (1858) (impact); Canning v.
Inhabitants of Williamstown, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 451 (1848) (impact); accord
Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227 (1880) (dictum) (no impact); Spade v. Lynn
& Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) (dictum) (no impact).
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), is the lead-
ing case in this country for denying recovery for negligently inflicted mental
distress unaccompanied by impact. This rule was followed by RESTATEMENT,
ToRTs § 47, comment a (1934): "[TJhe interest in mental and emotional
tranquility is not as a thing in itself regarded as of sufficient importance to
make tortious conduct which is intended or recognizably likely to cause only
a mental or emotional disturbance."
For a discussion of the creation and development of the impact rule, see
Lambert, Tort Liability for Psychic Inuries, 41 B.UL. REv. 584 (1961); 87
N.Y.U.L. REv. 31 (1962). For a complete study of the mechanical tests
employed by the courts in determining whether mental injuries resulting
from the negligence of defendant are compensable, see Brody, Negligently
Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return To Reason, 7 VmL. L. REv. 232 (1961).
15. Lewis v. Woodland, 101 Ohio App. 442, 140 N.E.2d 92 (1955); Colla
v. Mandella, I Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 845 (1957). The physical harm pro-
vides the basis of liability although mental suffering may be included as
part of the damages. RESTATEMNNT, TORTs § 306, comment b (Supp. 1948).
Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961),
overruled Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., supra note 14. The court discarded
"impact" as a condition precedent to recovery and stated: "Although fraud,
extra litigation and a measure of speculation, are, of course, possibilities, it
is no reason for a court to eschew a measure of its jurisdiction." 10 N.Y.2d
at 240-41, 176 N.E.2d at 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
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about by extreme and outrageous conduct.'
It is alleged that mental suffering is not susceptible to exact
measurement, is frequently inflicted in minor degrees, and may
be easily feigned.' 7 Hence, courts have been reluctant to permit
recovery in the absence of other factors lessening these dangers
and difficulties.' Thus, the "impact rule" in negligence cases is
intended to protect the courts against feigned cases, a flood of
litigation, and recovery of remote and speculative damages."o
The existence of an intentional tort would seem to perform this
same function, although courts allowing damages for mental
distress caused by an intentional tort fail to articulate a ration-
aleo Certainly the existence of assault, seduction, or slander, for
16. E.g., Cohen v. Lion Prods. Co., 177 F. Supp. 486 (D. Mass. 1959); State
Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952).
See generally Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALrr. L. REv. 40 (1956). The
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 46 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957), provides:
"One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress and for bodily harm resulting from it," For many years
legal writers have advocated recognition of intentional infliction of mental
distress as a separate and distinct tort. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as
Legal Damage, 20 MIcH. L. Ruv. 497 (1922); Magruder, Mental and Emo-
tional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REv. 1033 (1936); Prosser,
Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 87 MICn. L. REv.
874 (1939).
The defendant need not have actually intended to cause the emotional
disturbance. Knowledge on his part that severe emotional distress is sub-
stantially certain to be produced by his conduct is sufficient. Mitran v. Wil-
liamson, 21 Mise. 2d 106, 197 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
17. See, e.g., Perry v. Capital Traction Co., 32 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1929);
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
It has been argued that "if knowledge of . . . [psychic injuries] is so im-
perfect that any evidence pertaining to it is speculative and conjectural, it
may be as just, and more expedient, to refuse a remedy." Smith, supra note
8, at 198.
18. See PROSSER, TORTS §§ 11 & 55 (3d ed. 1964).
19. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
The courts, adhering to the physical damage rule, have found "impact"
in minor contacts with the person which in themselves cause no real harm to
the plaintiff. See Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E.
680 (1928) (defendant's horse emptied its bowels into plaintiff's lap); Ken-
tucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 282 Ky. 285, 28 S.W.
2d 272 (1929) (slight burn from live wire); Hess v. Philadelphia Transp. Co.,
858 Pa. 144, 56 A.2d 89 (1948) (slight electric shock).
20. See Wiggins v. Moskins Credit Clothing Store, 187 F. Supp. 764
(E.D.S.C. 1956); Smith & Gaston Funeral Directors, Inc. v. Wilson, 262 Ala.
401, 79 So. 2d. 48 (1955); Dawsey v. Newton, 244 Ala. 661, 15 So. 2d 271
(1943); Acadia, California, Ltd. v. Herbert, 54 Cal. 2d 328, 353 P.2d 294, 5
Cal. Rptr. 686 (1960); Kuhr Bros., Inc. v. Spahos, 89 Ga. App. 885, 81 S.E.2d
491 (1954); Oglesby v. Town of Winnfield, 27 So. 2d 137 (La. Ct. App. 1946);
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example, provides some assurance that the mental suffering is
genuine and the direct or natural result of the act.2' This is also
true of some trespasses, for example, a trespass to the grave of
a loved one 2 But neither "slight impacts" 23 nor "slight inten-
tional torts"2 4 guarantee that the resultant mental suffering is
severe or genuine. In the instant case, for example, an inten-
tional tort was committed, but evidence indicated that the mental
suffering was of the most transitory nature and was aggravated
by a preexisting nervous condition?2 In addition, the requirement
that the malicious act constitute an intentional tort may preclude
recovery on facts not substantially different from those where
recovery is granted. In the instant case, for example, had a
neighbor of the plaintiff witnessed the malicious destruction of
the dog, he would be denied recovery because he had no property
interest in the dog?"6
Henderson v. Weidman, 88 Neb. 813, 180 N.W. 579 (1911); Michels v.
Crouch, 122 S.W.Qd 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Murphy v. City of Tacoma,
60 Wash. 2d 603, 374 P.2d 976 (1962).
Where property is only negligently destroyed, recovery for mental dis-
tress is not allowed. See cases cited supra.
21. See, e.g., McChristian v. Popkin, 75 Cal. App. 2d 249, 171 P.2d 85
(Dist. Ct. App. 1946) (assault); McMullen v. Corkum, 143 Me. 47, 54 A.2d
753 (1947) (slander imputing criminal charge); Dwire v. Stearns, 44 N.D.
199, 179 N.W. 69 (1919) (mental suffering of family resulting from seduction
of daughter).
92. See Michels v. Crouch, 122 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
23. Compare Porter v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 Atl. 860
(Sup. Ct. 1906) (mental distress recovered when train crash threw dust into
eyes), 'with Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). In
Mitchell, recovery for mental distress was denied to a pregnant woman suf-
fering a miscarriage when runaway horses stopped inches short of impact.
One must grant that the requirement [of impact] has some relevancy,
for if a dangerous force comes near enough to graze one's person, it is
likely to cause more psychic reaction than if it remains at a distance.
But it is doubtful that a car which brushes against a person frightens
him any more than one which misses him by an inch.
Smith, supra note 8, at 300 n.296. Impact should be treated merely as
an evidentiary factor bearing upon the reasonableness of the plaintiff's psychic
responses. See ibid.
24. A "slight intentional tort" occurs when the technical requirements of
an intentional tort are present but the magnitude of the harm is slight, as
when defendant intentionally walks over plaintiff's land.
25. Plaintiffs doctor, who had been treating her for a nervous condition
for two years prior to the occurrence, stated that her nervous condition at
the time of trial was the same as it would have been if the dog had not died.
Associated Independents, Inc. v. La Porte, 158 So. 2d 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963).
26. No case has been found where the plaintiff did not have an interest
in the property destroyed.
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Courts requiring a high degree of culpability on the defend-
ant's part in committing the intentional tort also seem to be
attempting to lessen the supposed dangers and difficulties of
compensating for mental suffering. If the conduct of the actor is
malicious or wanton, it is arguably more likely that the mental
suffering will be severe and the direct result of the act.2 7 But
this is not necessarily so. If in the instant case the dog had been
negligently killed, the plaintiff's mental suffering probably would
have been just as severe and immediate. The dog's death and
not the actor's conduct would appear to be the primary cause
of the mental suffering. Hence, neither the requirement of an
intentional tort nor the requirement that defendant's conduct
be wrongful28 appreciably lessens the difficulties.
Because the technical rules developed by the courts appear to
be of little value in distinguishing between meritorious and
feigned claims, a better approach might be to treat mental dis-
tress as a distinct cause of action. Instead of relying on such
factors as "impact," "intentional tort," and "malice," recovery
should be granted if the mental suffering is severe, genuine, and
a direct consequence of proximately related conduct unreasonably
exposing the plaintiff to risk of such injury.29 Medical advances
reduce the problem in determining the existence, severity, and
causation of the mental sufferingfa0 The remaining difficulties are
not alleviated by the existence of a slight impact or intentional
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECoND), TORTS § 46, comment j (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1957).
28. When damages for mental suffering are recovered because the act was
malicious, punitive damages will probably be awarded too. But see Knierim v.
Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961). This has the effect of punishing
the defendant twice. "The trier of fact cannot possibly escape the psycho-
logical urge to make damages [for mental suffering] correspond to the actor's
culpability, and this makes the award punitive even though in theory it is
still compensatory." Smith, supra note 8, at 928-29 n.128.
Recovery of damages for mental distress also tends to become punitive
when rules of causation and foreseeability are less strictly applied to the
results of wanton behavior, see Bower, The Degree of Moral Fault as Affecting
Defendant's Liability, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 586, 588 (1933), and when the
impact requirement is waived for wanton or willful torts, see Smith, supra
note 8, at 233. The justification may be that malicious wrongdoers simply
are not worthy of social solicitude. See id. at 5M2-33.
29. This would be similar to the approach taken by the American Law
Institute with respect to the intentional infliction of mental suffering. See
note 16 supra.
30. See generally Goodrich, supra note 16; Smith, Relation of Emotions
to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV.
193 (1944); Smith & Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, s0 VA. L. REV.
87 (1943).
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tort. A limitation can be placed on the defendant's responsibility
for the consequences of his conduct by balancing policy considera-
tions.3 The policy considerations should be based upon the social
utility of the actor's conductS2 and the seriousness of the injured
party's injury.ss Thus, if the dog had been struck and killed by
an ambulance on an emergency call, the social utility of defend-
ant's act would outweigh plaintiff's right to mental security. On
the other hand, since there is little social utility in a malicious
act of destroying property, liability would be indicated. Such
consideration of the competing interests would give both plaintiff
and defendant more equitable treatment than can be had when
reliance is placed upon the unreasoned historical pigeonholes al-
lowing recovery of damages for mental suffering.
31. See PROSSER, TORTs § 49, at 282 (3d ed. 1964), where the author
states this limitation in terms of "proximate cause."
82.
[W]hen the general social utility of an activity is deemed to outweigh
the particular interests with which it may clash, important policy rea-
sons dictate that some limits be set to liability for its consequences.
... Thus, in cases where the defendant's conduct involved negligent
driving of a motor vehicle the courts conclude that to extend liability
to spectators who were not themselves in danger "would, in our opin-
ion, place an unreasonable burden upon users of highways."
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 314, 379 P.2d 513,
524-25, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 44-5 (1963); accord, Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md.
479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497
(1935). But of. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958), in the
same jurisdiction as Amaya, which applied a test of the moral blame attached
to the defendant's conduct similar to the test used in La Porte. The Amaya
court also concluded that our present insurance system could not bear the
losses if a duty were recognized in this type of situation. 59 Cal. 2d at 314,
379 P.2d at 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
33. See, Magruder, supra note 16, at 1035; Smith, supra note 30, at 928-29
n.128. See generally Smith & Solomon, supra note 30.

